Petition for Rehearing (Dec. 22, 1981)
No. 81-427
IN THE
SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1981
GARRY DAVIS
Petitioner
v.
DISTRICT DIRECTOR
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE
Respondent
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Garry Davis
Petitioner
Pro Se
Address of Petitioner:
Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Contents
i
Table of Authorities
ii
Grounds for Petition for
Rehearing
1
Argumentation
1
Certificate of Good Faith
9
Certificate of Service
10
Appendix
1a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited:
Page
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill,
U.S. 604, 550,281
1
Buffington v. Day, Mass. 1871, 78
U.S. 124, 11 Wall, 124, 20 L. Ed. 122
4
Hickman v. Taylor, 327 U.S. 808, 328
U.S. 876, 329
1
Lichter v. U.S., 334, U.S. 742,
1782, 1948
6
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat, 326,
or 14 U.S., p. 304, (1816)
3
Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'r.,
3 Dall 91
6
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635,
(1863), 170
6
Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 347
3
U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220
5
U.S. v. Williams, N.Y. 1904, 2 S.C. 119,
194 U.S. 295, 48 L Ed. 979
4
Van Horne v. Dorrace, 1795, CC Pa.,
2 Dall 304, 310 1 L Ed. 391,
F Case No. 16857
3
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall, 231
p. 19.
6
Martin v. Mott, 12 Weat(or 25 U.S.)
p. 19.
6
OTHER
Page
Warren Burger, Chief Justice, S.C.
7
Wm. O. Douglas, Justice, S.C.
7
Constitutional Dictatorship
C. Rossiter, 1948.
5
Albert Einstein
Letter to World Federalists
4
Robert J. Jackson
Chief Prosecutor, Nuremberg War
Crimes Tribunal.
1
Thomas Jefferson
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of
Taking Up Arms, 1775.
1
Modern Constitutional Law
Chester J. Antieau, 1969.
1,3
New York Times.
6
Nine Justices In Search of a Doctine
Emerson, 1965.
3
Presidential Power In A Nutshell
Arthur S. Miller, 1977
2,5,6
The Charter & Judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal.
1
Total War and the Constitution
E. Corwin, 1946.
5
United Nations' Secretary General.
2,7
Earl Warren, Chief Justice, S.C.
2,7
World Habeas Corpus
Luis Kutner, 1968
1,5
GROUNDS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARING:
This petition for rehearing is intended to clarify
arguments advanced in original petition for certiorari.
Hickman v. Taylor, 327 U.S. 808, 328 U.S. 876, 329 U.S.
495;Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 280 U.S. 604, 550,
281.1
The underlying issue herein under review is that of
ultimate sovereignty which the nation claims but which
claim, in terms of world war, is both anachronistic and
suicidal versus the sovereignty of an individual world
citizen exercising inalienable human rights,
representative of and speaking for all humankind.2
Petitioner respectfully submits that the instant case
offers unique features permitting the Court to affirm its
historic mandate, "Equal Justice Under Law", as well as its
given constitutional prerogative as envisioned by the
framer when confronted with an executive impotent to
make peace by sanctioning once again the inalienable
rights of the people, justly and democratically. exercised
by your petitioner.3
The concept of expatriation when linked to
statelessness as argued in the previous petition (p. ___)
exposes a basic dichotomy in national law revealed by
petitioner's alleged renunciation of nationality. That
dichotomy posits the inalienable sovereignty of the
individual, the primary source of national " as well as
local and state " law itself against the national sovereignty
as an exclusive political fiction.4
The instant case dramatically focuses juridical attention
on this dichotomy in a novel interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment and is germane to the issue of war itself which
petitioner seeks to clarify below.
It would be absurd to argue that the exclusive character
of the nation was absolute and eternal. Such an argument
would be a denial of the evolution of law itself from which
resulted the United States Constitution " as all national
constitutions " in the first place.5
The absence of a world government to which the
petitioner could refer his prime civic commitment as a
countervailing force to world war obliged him to divest
himself of the national exclusive character which per se
violated the principle of a planetary citizenship alone
capable of coping with the global problems facing him.6
Petitioner suggests that the implicit and historic
advantage of the United States Constitution is contained in
its provision for acts of individual sovereignty via the 9th
and 10th amendments in situations arising from
circumstances distinct from those which resulted in the
constitution originally.6
Not to recognize this constitutional advantage would be
to deny the essential unversality of the constitution itself
as well as the innate and inalienable sovereignty of the
people. ("The theory of our political system is that the
ultimate sovereignty is in the people from whom springs
all legitimate authority." McLean, J. in Spooner v.
McConnell, 1. McLean, 347.)
With respect to the framer's commitment to the
amendment of "enumerated rights," (9th), petitioner
respectfully suggests that the Court address the question:
As citizenship itself is defined within the parameters of a
civic code, are not the rights "retained by the people"
natural or human rights existing outside the purview of
that code, in this case the U.S. Constitution itself?
(Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 1795, CC Pa., 2 Dall 304, 310 1 L Ed
391, 394, F Cas No. 16857: "The Supreme Court in 1793 said
there were "natural, inherent and inalienable rights of
man.."").
Pertinent to this question, would not this reasoning be
supported by the framers themselves who, bound civically
by their separate state constitutions, nevertheless
exercised sovereign rights outside those then exclusive
legal frameworks in order to formulate, then codify in a
document a new sovereignty which was innate and
inalienable in the people themselves, distinct from that of
the several states 8 , that of the United States of America?
Pursuing this strictly constructionist line of argument,
petitioner further inquires of the Court by what right this
new and inclusive government was founded if civic rights
were circumscribed on by the existing state codes? Is not
the answer self-evident " affirmed by the 9th and 10th
amendments " that the people retained rights not codified
and indeed uncodifiable by such codes, the major one
being the right to choose a new political identity for the
protection of those very rights?
This Court, of course, cannot determine further that the
founding fathers, in maintaining the sovereignty of the
people via both the 9th and the 10th amendments, were
condoning anarchy in recognizing rights beyond the
Constitution's limits. For it would then be denying due
process per se. Yet when the violations of human rights
are perpetrated by the national government itself " as in
the instant case and in myriad others throughout the
world " as a person with legal standing before this High
Court, petitioner has the right and duty to inquire by what
legal process can such inalienable rights be protected?
The question is not only germane to his personal situation,
as described in the petition for certiorari, but to a host of
global issues of which war " legitimized by the very
nation-state system " is the central one.9
The paradox seems insoluble unless we admit to higher
laws therefore uncodified by the nation, to which the
people could refer. In their judicial recognition of the
limitations of the Constitution and retained powers of the
people, the courts have referred obliquely to these laws:
The powers the people have given to the
general government are named in the
Constitution, and all not there named, either
expressly or by implication are reserved to
the people and can be exercised only by them,
or upon further grant from them. (Emphasis
added). U.S. v. Williams, N.Y. 1904,2 S.C. 119,
194 U.S. 295, 48 L Ed. 979.
Such common laws, protecting fundamental human
rights, existing outside and independent of national
constitutional law, could only be worldly in character.
They need not however be inconsistent with national or
local law. The relationship of the several states to the
federal union is not irrelevant here:
The general government and the states,
although both exist within the same
territorial limits, are separate and distinct
sovereignties, acting separately and
independently of each other, within their
respective spheres. Buffington v. Day, Mass.
1871,78 U.S. 124, 11 Wall. 124, 20 L Ed. 122.
This Court cannot but determine that these
natural/human rights require legal protection since it
itself is the juridical inheritor of the very constitutive
process by which such protection was, until the advent of
total war, afforded. But, in that petitioner's
natural/human rights are not only not protected by the
United States sovereignty but indeed menaced by it " in
the sense that the U.s. government has no legislative or
judicial control over the actions of any other sovereign
state, its so-called foreign policy therefore being
essentially reactive, i.e. defensive " petitioner's right to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to name those
inalienable rights enshrined in the Declaration of
Independence, are unsecured.
This Court's grant of certiorari will not only confirm
the mandate of the 9th and 10th amendments but will, at
last, uphold the very constitutive process as the sine qua
non of world peace.
In other words, a world citizenship unprohibited and
undenied by the U.S. constitution " as the state
constitutions neither prohibited nor denied a national
constitution " both recognizing and protecting
inalienable human rights could be confirmed by this Court
as not only the rightful political expression of popular
sovereignty implied in both the 9th and 10th amendments,
but the direct and substantive challenge to war-making
itself at a moment when such judicial insight is
desperately needed by a world of ready-to-explode nation-
states. Today's very headlines starkly underline this
imperative need.
Contrarily, a denial of certiorari may be interpreted as
confirming the infamous and contemptible dictum inter
armes silent leges which has dominated the Court's history
from its inception.10
To illustrate this charge, petitioner cites Justice
Marshall's observation in 1803 th at
By the constitution of the United States the
President is vested with certain important
political powers in the exercise of which he is
to use his own discretion...and whatever
opinion may be entertained at the manner in
which executive discretion may be used, still
there exists, and can exist, no power to
control that discretion.11
How may the citizen view this "monarchical" power in
view of Justice Samuel Miller's opinion in the U.S. v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, 220, 1882, that
No man is so high that he is above the law.
All...officers are creatures of the law and are
bound to it?
It is clear that the Constitution both defines the
parameters of legitimacy while yet conferring on the
President arbitrary powers in his capacity as Head of
State " totally vitiating the concept and exercise of civic
rights " placing him thereby "outside" those parameters.
"In times of declared war," according to Arthur S.
Miller, (Presidential Power In A Nutshell, p. 19),
"particularly in the 20th century when wars have become
planetary in extent, the President acts as a "constitutional
dictator". There is a tacit understanding that nothing "
literally nothing " will be permitted to block winning the
war. What is necessary, as determined by the executive, is
done. Legal niceties are given little attention. National
survival is the ultimate issue." (Emphasis added.)
In short, "Judicial control of presidential action is next
to nonexistent." (Ibid., p. 30)
Yet, war to be legitimate, must be winnable.
The war powers of Congress and the
President are only those to be derived from
the Constitution...the primary application of a
war power is that it shall be an effective
power to wage war successfully. (Emphasis
added.) Lichter v. U.S., 334 U.S. 742, 782, 1948
per Burton, J.
Also, the war-making power must be accompanied by
its opposite: peace-making power:
The authority to make war of necessity
implied the power to make peace, or the war
must be perpetual... Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall,
231 per Chase, J. (See also Penhallow v.
Doane's Adm'r., 3 Dall 91, remarks of Tredell,
J.)
Yet the U.S. President declared on October 21,
1981:
In a nuclear war, all mankind would
lose.(New York Times, Oct. 22, 1981)
This statement only confirms overwhelming
evidence since 1945 of the totality of modern war,
both conventional and nuclear.
If indeed war is no longer winnable and its
"end" is total annihilation, it can no longer be
considered legitimate.
The history of the discretionary powers of the
U.S. President as Head of State is, of course, not at
issue in the instant case. Nonetheless, in his claim
to recognition by this court as a world citizen
following Judge Thomas Flannery's oblique
recognition (See Memorandum and Opinion, District
Court, p. 11), petitioner cannot but challenge
incidentally such arbitrary power as a fundamental
contradiction of the constitutional process itself.
As Arthur Miller rightly contends, "...the United
States has one Constitution for peacetime and
another for wartime." (Presidential Power In A
Nutshell, p. 184.) (See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 1863,
Grier, J.; also Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) p.
19)
As determined by the lower courts' decisions in
agreement with the INS's determinations as to the
petitioner's status plus this Court's denial to date of
certiorari, he is likewise "outside" those parameters as is
the U.S. President. For as a person enjoying
natural/human rights, does he not also enjoy
"discretionary power" to represent his own sovereignty
along with that of humankind per se? And is not this
Court's denial of certiorari tacit confirmation of that
"discretionary power" which cannot but be inherent in
the exercise of inalienable rights?
It goes without saying that, in the event of a nuclear
war, when the nation is destroyed, as the U.S. President has
advised us, this court will likewise cease to exist. In the
face of this ultimate threat to the nation, does not this
Court have an imperative judicial obligation to utilize
whatever powers it possesses constitutionally to avert such
a catastrophe? Or else the aspirations and sacrifices of the
original framers and their descendants would have been
in vain.
Your petitioner, in standing before the bar of world
public opinion for over thirty years as a world citizen, is
evidently not alone in his quest for a peaceful world
through just law.
No less distinguished a jurist than former Chief Justice
Earl Warren stated in 1954:
In these trouble times, the hope for a peaceful
world is of a world based on law as distinct
from a world based on authority...
Then former Justice William O. Douglas reminded us in
1958:
More and more people are coming to realize
that peace is the product of law and order;
that law is essential if the force of arms is not
to rule the world.
The present Chief Justice, in greeting the assembled
jurists from over 100 nations at the 1975 World Peace
Through Law Conference in Washington, stated in part:
We agree that man was meant to be free
and that a state should be the agent and
servant of its people, not the master...We
agree that the proceedings of justice and the
search for peace are among the highest
aspirations of human beings...We know that
justice is indivisible; it recognizes no
boundaries; it is not confined in concepts of
geography or jurisdiction; it is not limited in
terms of language, creed, or political
doctrines. It belongs to all who are now alive
and to all those unborn who will follow us.
(See Appendix for additional statements from
Heads of State)
CONCLUSIONS
Wherefore, in this universal spirit of "Equal Justice
Under Law", which is a global rallying-cry for
beleaguered humanity itself, Petitioner respectfully
requests that this Court grant this Petition for Rehearing.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/Garry Davis
Petitioner Pro Se
3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 2016
December 22, 1981
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
Petitioner hereby certifies that the foregoing Petition
for Rehearing, was
submitted in good faith and not for purpose of delay.
/s/ Garry Davis
Petitioner-Pro Se
3606 Ordway St.,
N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20016
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this __22nd__ day of December, 1981
at Washington, D.C.
(signature ?)
Notary Public
My Commission Expires February 14, 1985
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that three copies of the foregoing
Petition for Rehearing were mailed by regular mail or
delivered to JAMES P. MORRIS, Attorney, General Litigation
and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, and ERIC A.
FISHER, Attorney, Department of Justice, Criminal Division,
Washington, D.C. 20530.
/s/ Garry Davis
Petitioner-Pro Se
3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
December, 1981
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543
January 25, 1982
Mr. Garry Davis
3606 Ordway Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016
Re: Garry Davis
v. District Director, Immigration and
Naturalization Service
No. 81-427
Dear Mr. Davis:
The Court today entered the following order in the
above entitled
case:
The petition for rehearing is denied.
Very truly yours,
/s/Alexander L.
Stevas, Clerk
NEWS RELEASE February 1, 1982
SUPREME COURT REFUSAL TO CONSIDER WORLD
CITIZEN GARRY DAVIS' CASE VS. THE I.N.S. POSES
PROBLEM FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT: DEPORT HIM,
DETAIN HIM OR FORGET HIM?
WASHINGTON, D.C.ÑThe case of Garry Davis, which
began actually when he stepped off the Pan Am plane at
Dulles Airport on May 13, 1977, versus the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service is seemingly closed. Or is it?
Legally, Davis is still stepping off that plane. On
January 22, 1982, the Supreme Court denied Davis' last
appeal for a hearing after having refused to grant him
certiorari on October 9, 1981 to review lower court rulings.
The Court's decision in effect confirms these rulings
that the 60-year-old American-born Davis is an
"excludable alien" as well as a "stateless person." Now the
INS has to legitimately exclude him.
But to where?
Unlike the Cubans, Haitians, Iranians, Ethiopians,
Mexicans, Russians and numerous other nationalities now
living legally or illegally in the United States, Davis, a U.S.
bomber pilot in World War II, has no other country to
which he can be "returned."
In his petition for certiorari, he challenged both the
law allowing expatriation and the law excluding him from
his native land. He claimed as well that the ninth
amendment of the U.S. Constitution protected his
inalienable rights to claim a new political identity in the
face of an imminent world war between nation-states.
Then, in his Petition for Rehearing, Davis challenged
the U.S. president's discretionary powers which, he claims,
can lead to world war, positing the discretionary powers of
the citizen to "make peace" by raising the level of civic
commitment to the global level.
Ironically, he heads a District of Columbia-based
corporation, the World Service Authority, which issues the
very passport the INS refuses to recognize to individuals
throughout the world who either have no national
documents and cannot obtain them or whose national
papers are invalid and cannot be renewed.
The WSA was founded in 1954 as the administration
agency of the world government declared by Davis on
September 4, 1953 from Ellsworth, Maine. To date, over
250,000 WSA documents have been issued, mostly to
refugees and stateless persons. They have been recognized
on a case-by-case basis by over 60 nations according to
WSA records. These include, incredibly enough, the United
States.
"I have claimed for over thirty years," Davis said, "that
the nation-state system was incapable of solving global
problems. President Reagan, in his State of the Union
message, clearly confirmed this position. He had no plan
for world peace claiming only that military strength
insures peace, a total denial of his own role as chief
executor of the national law. He even referred to George
Washington who, as the nation's first president,
symbolized the triumph of law over anarchy. Then
Reagan's so-called new federalism is a backward step
without a new federalism extending to the world
community itself. National dictators fear above all the loss
of their power-base, the nation-state.
"In 1787, the founding fathers also proposed a "new
federalism" of which President Reagan is the latest
presidential inheritor. But, ironically, Reagan has no
plans for a world federation to protect the several nations
and the world's people. We, the world's people, must
therefore take our destiny in our own hands."
The World Government of World Citizens has registered
over 100,000 citizens and has issued the world passport to
Afghanistan refugees in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and
elsewhere, Eritreans in Saudi Arabia, Burmese, Vienamese
and other southeast Asian refugees in Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia, African refugees in the Sudan, Somalia,
Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, etc., seamen with invalid
national passports, and the tens of thousands of others
who, for one reason or another, have problems with
national travel documents.
Since Davis has no other country to which he can be
deported, the INS must either detain him permanently
or...do nothing. In that case, Davis will have in effect won
his right to remain in the United States indefinitely. The
only question remains, what is his status?
According to the law, he is not yet legally admitted.
Therefore, he is not legally here. Now the Supreme Court,
which permitted him to petition it, therefore, obviously
considered him a person before the law, has contrarily
denied him a legal status in the United States. Or, indeed, is
its decision a tacit confirmation that Davis' "inalienable
rights" can only be exercised by him as he claims and will
neither be prohibited nor denied by the high court?
The second question concerns his right to travel. The
INS will obviously not deny his right to leave the United
States. But what happens when he returns? He still will be
deportable according to the law. Will the INS then detain
him permanently or, as it has done since May 17, 1977, will
it consider him a "free agent" continually getting off the
plane but physically able to come and go as he pleases?
If so, the World Citizen will have proved his case.
V
The U.S. Supreme Court and World Citizenship
A Postscript
The U.S. Supreme Court, on October 19, 1981 and January
25, 1982 respectively, denied both my petition for
certiorari and Petition for Rehearing to be considered a
legal world citizen in the United States.
The decision has proved my thesis that my right to
identify myself as a world citizen is indeed legal.
How do I arrive at that seemingly extraordinary
conclusion? First of all, since January 25, 1982, when the
final court decision was published, the lower courts'
decision " that I am an "excludable alien" as well as
"stateless" " prevail according to U.S. law. This in turn
obliges the Immigration and Naturalization Service to
"exclude" me from U.S. soil.
In that the same INS contends that I am "stateless" and
therefore unexcludable, it has failed to obey that U.S. law at
this present writing. (Other "excludable aliens", Haitians,
Afghans, etc. remain in U.S. jails.)
This conclusion, that the U.S. code was inoperable in my
case, was part of my argument to the Supreme court.
What then is my legal status in the United States? In
default of U.S. law assigning me a legitimate one, it can
only be that which I myself claim.
Secondly, in both petitions, I claimed that the Ninth
Amendment " "The rights enumerated in the Constitution
do not deny or disparage other rights retained by the
people" " sanctions the exercise of the inalienable
right to claim a new and higher political allegiance along
with the existing ones.
That is precisely what the founding Fathers did. Why
"founding"? Why "fathers"? The very two words connote
a newly created entity.
In denying my petitions, the high court in effect
denied its jurisdiction in determining the nature of those
rights "retained by the people" in that such rights, being
inalienable, are thus anterior to the formulation of the
Constitution itself and the founding of the Court.
Thirdly, the Supreme Court upheld the long-standing
principle that expatriation is a human right regardless
of the consequences of statelessness.
That means, incidentally, that any Haitian, Ethiopian,
Eritrean, Iraqian, Iranian, Mexican, Ghanaian, Nigerian,
Russian, Israeli, Burmese, Vietnamese, etc. who arrives on
U.S. shores by whatever route or means can unilaterally
renounce his or her nationality " a registered letter is
sufficient " return all state documents and the U.S. law
must in turn respect that human right.
In fact, this right is actually spelled out in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15(2):
"Everyone has the right to a nationality and everyone has
the right to change his nationality."
If we have the right to "change" our nationality,
obviously we have the right to choose our own
government.
That is one of the inalienable rights implied in the
Ninth Amendment. The 1981 Human Rights Report of the
U.S. State Department, confirms this revolutionary notion
categorically: "Individuals do not owe their humanity to
the community, as earlier philosophies often argued; the
community owes its whole legitimacy to the
individuals whose existence is prior to it."
(Emphasis added)(p. 3, col. 2)
Now comes the political bombshell. If the expatriate "
or the national citizen " willfully chooses World
Government as the object of his/her sovereign global
allegiance as many are today doing in lieu of any
other government to represent them at this
highest and newest civic level, they have thus
legalized themselves in a revolutionary yet non-
violent and democratic way and in perfect conformity with
both U.S. historical precedent and constitutional law!
Now is the time once again to test my theory in the field
of world action.
1/"Any constitutional society commits itself to certain values, and
the United States by the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights
is consciously dedicated to individual liberty, integrity, and
equality, an open society, and the rule of law. Of these values the
Supreme Court is the ultimate guardian and trustee.
Modern Constitutional Law, Chester J. Antieau, Vol. 1 V
(1969) The Lawyer Co- Operative Publishing Co.
2/"...a reverence for our great Creator, principles of humanity, and
the dictates of conscience, must convince all those who reflect upon
the subject that government was instituted to promote the welfare of
mankind and ought to be administered for the attainment of that
end."
Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of the Causes and Necessity
of Taking Up Arms, Continental Congress, 1775.
"...the very essence of the charter (Charter of the Tribunal,
Nuremberg) is that individuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the
individual state. He who violates the laws of war can not obtain
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if
the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under
international law."
The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1949 (See
Office of United States Chief of Counsel of Prosecution of Axis
Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Opinion and
Judgment, Government Printing Office, 1947)
"Any method of maintaining international peace today must
eventually fail if it is not grounded on Justice under Law and the
protection of the Individual under due process of law."
World Habeas Corpus, Luis Kutner, 1968, p. 73
3/"Let it be stated again that the generation that gave us the
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution believed solidly in
the doctrine of natural rights. They understood that the purpose of
government was to protect men in their basic, natural rights, and
they were sure that they could hold their own state governments to
this end."
Modern Constitutional Law, Chester J. Antieau, p. 676
"International Law is more than a scholarly collection of
abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties
and agreements between nations of accepted customs. Yet every
custom has its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to
be initiated by the action of some state. Unless we are prepared to
abandon every principle of growth for international law, we cannot
deny that our own day has the right to initiate customs and to
conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer
and strengthened international law..."
Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor at the
Nuremberg war crime trials, 1945; J.S.C.
4/ "Since under the express terms of the constitution, there is no
one political sovereign Ñ other than the ill-formed notion of
"popular sovereignty", which are taken seriously only as slogans but
not as descriptions of reality Ñ the theoretical problem of
sovereignty in the United States has not yet been fully resolved."
Presidential Power In A Nutshell, Arthur S. Miller, West
Publishing Co., 1977
5/"A Constitution designed to endure for the ages to come must
perforce bend with the winds of social change."
Ibid. p. 67
"Each generation writes its own constitution, just as each
generation writes its own history."
Ibid. p. 67
"Constitutional law in essence is politics writ large; and
government is always relative to circumstances."
Ibid. p. 67
The only intention of the Founding Fathers worth serious
attention today is that they left the tasks of governance to the good
sense and wisdom of succeeding generations of Americans."
Ibid. p. 66
"Government can be safely acknowledged a temporal blessing
because, in terms of the power it wields, there is nothing inherent
in it. Government is not an end in itself but a means to an end. Its
authority is the free and revocable grant of the men who have
promised conditionally to submit to it. Its organs, however ancient
and august, are instruments that free men have built and free men
can alter or even abolish."
Earl Warren, C.J., S.C.
6/ The United Nations Secretary-General, in his supplementary
Report to the General Assembly of 24 October 1946 stated that "In
the interests of peace, and in order to protect mankind against
future wars, it will be of decisive significance to have the
principles which were implied in the Nuremberg trials (II.
Jurisdiction and General Principles, Article 6(a)(b) and (c) which
defines "crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for
which there shall be individual responsibility"), and according to
which the German war criminals were sentenced, made a permanent
part of the body of international laws as quickly as possible. From
now on the instigators of new wars must know that there exists both
law and punishment for their crimes. Here we have a high
inspiration to go forward and begin the task of working toward a
revitalized system of international law."
On 15 November 1946, the U.S. delegation introduced a proposal
to the U.N. "...to initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of encouraging the progressive development of
international law and its codification..." and reaffirmed "...the
principle of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the tribunal."
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 488 48(v) 1950,"Nuremberg
Trials", entered the priniples to international law.
The right to assume individual civic responsibility in a given
community is the essence of course of the democratic principle and
the true meaning of sovereignty. This has been subseuently
confirmed byArt.1,2,3,6,7,15(2),18,19 and 29 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
7/ "The Government of the United States can claim no powers which
are not granted it by the constitution; and the powers actually
granted must be such as are expressly given or given by necessary
implication."
Per Marshall, C.J., Martin v. Hunter's Lesse, 1 Wheat.
326,(from Virginia Ct.) (1816)
"Mr. Justice Douglas' use of the ninth amendment carries a
greater potential. Under his theory, the ninth amendment might be
utilized to expand the concept of privacy or, perhaps, to guarantee
other basic rights." (Emerson)
Nine Justices In Search of a Doctrine, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 219,
227 (1965) (See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-39 (1971)
(Douglas, J. dissenting). (See B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth
Amendment, (1955); Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth
Amendment, 42 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1956); Kelley, The Uncertain
Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 814 (1966);
Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 Ind.
L.J. 309 (1936); Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The
"Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 Marq. L. Rev. 121 (1967);
Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 231 (1975); Ringold,The History of
the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Development,
8 Tulsa L.J. 1 (1972); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 Calif. L. Rev.
787 (1959)
8/ "At the time the Articles of Confederation were adopted the
overwhelming majority of Americans accepted the doctrine of
natural rights. all men possessed certain basic, fundamental rights
which government could not deny. Government was organized to
protect and safeguard these rights. It was the unspoken assumption
in the Continental Congress that no state could ever justifiably
deny to its own citizens their natural rights. It was unthinkable
that the possessors of political power needed he protection of the
Articles of Confederation against their temporary trustees of
governance..." (Emphasis added.)
Modern Constitutional Law, Chester J. Antieau, Vol. 1, v.
(1969) p. 673
9/ "Material progress in total destructive explosive weapons has
yielded the conclusion that the right to individual security is the
pre-requisite of all other human rights and freedoms. collective
individual security can be protected only under the Rule of Law and
in the mainstream of Due Process of law.
World Habeas Corpus< Luis Kutner, 1962, p. 71
"As long as their are sovereign nations possessing great power,
war is inevitable. There is no salvation for civilization, or even the
human race, other hand the creation f a world government."
Albert Einstein, Letter to World Federalists, Stockholm
Congress, 1949.
10/ "The judicial attitude is more than abstention; it verges at
times upon courts being an arm of the executive when violence,
foreign or domestic, erupts."
Presidential Power In A Nutshell, Arthur S. Miller, p. 163,
(See also A Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone,
Pillar of the Law, 1958)
11/ "It requires no special prescience to forecast that
should a thermonuclear war erupt the Present and his
subordinates will do whatever they think is necessary to
maximum the national interest, without regard to the
Constitution, the Congress or the Courts."
Cf. El Corwin, Total War and the Constitution, 1946; C.
Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 1948.
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